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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

,)
Respondent, (
, Case No.

vs.

I

DAR,VIN OLSEN,

)

iosn

Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Darwin Olsen, appeals from a conviction of the crime of burglary in the second degree
in the First Judicial District Court, Cache County,
State of Utah. ·
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with
the crime of burglary in the second degree. Appellant
1

waived jury trial and the matter was heard No
b
vem er
29, 1966, by the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, Sixth
J udical District, sitting by invitation, and appellant
was found guilty. Sentence was imposed J anuar
y t
1967, of confinement in the Utah State Prison for the
intermediate term as provided by law of not less than
one nor more than twenty years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
First Judicial District Court should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the following statement of facts as being more in keeping with
the rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in
a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.
During the night of March 3-4, 1966, the Hyrum
Drug Store, Hyrum, Utah, was entered and a quantity
of narcotic drugs was taken from a locked cabinet
within the store (T. 13). There had been a light snowfall that night and two sets of tracks were seen leading
from the rear of the store through an adjacent pasture
and then northward back to the main road ( T. 116) .
One track was narrow-toed and small heeled, akin to
an Italian boot. The other was a round-toed shoe mark
(T. 117).

2

Dennis Hunt and .Mary Jones, the two State witnesses, testified that appellant and one l\Iichael Nielson
had accompanied them on the evening of )larch 3,
I 966, on an automobile ride from Logan, Utah, to
Pocatello, Idaho, back to Logan, Utah, then to Hyrum,
Utah, and finally to Ogden, Utah (T. 52, 54).
They stopped at appellant's home and appellant
brought out a crowbar ( T. 54). 'Vhile .Mary Jones
was inside of the vehicle with the windows up (T. 57),
Hunt, Nielson, and appellant were inYoh,ed in a discussion as to a possible breaking and entry somewhere
in Hyrum (T. 56).
Hunt parked his vehicle approximately one block
north of the Hyrum Drug Store and appellant and
Nielson left the vehicle carrying the crowbar and an
empty zippered bag ( T. 58). Hunt and .Mary Jones
then drove around Hyrum for thirty to forty minutes
until returning to pick the two up. \Vhile so stopped,
the Hunt vehicle was seen by an eye witness (T. 43).
Mary Jones testified that she saw the two men go
across the pasture toward the store and that she later
heard a screeching noise coming from the store ( T.
132).

When appellant and Nielson returned to the vehicle,
the zippered bag was full of bottles ( T. 132) . The four
then returned to Ogden, Utah, where the bag was
opened revealing numerous types of narcotics; labels
were scraped off several bottles by Nielson and appellant (T. 135). During this period, Nielson was wearing

3

pointe~ toed shoes with a small heel ( T. 136). These
narcotics were later turned over to the Cacl1e c
. ,
.
ounty
Sheriffs office by Hunt and identified by the 0
wner
of the drug store as coming from his supply by the cost
codes on the bottles (T. 21, 22).

ARGU~IENT

POINT I
STATE'S WITNESS, DENNIS HUNT, 'VAS
NOT AN ACCOMPLICE AS A MATTER OF
LAW; THEREFORE, HIS TESTIMONY REQUIRES NO CORROBORATION.
Appellant attempts to show that one of the State's
witnesses, Dennis Hunt, was an accomplice to the crime
for which appellant stands committed and, therefore,
this testimony requires corroboration to be admitted.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953).
Respondent would say only that in no way does
appellant's characterization of Hunt ring true. Hunt
had no hand in the planning of the burglary of this
specific store. He only had some notice that appellant
and Nielson were planning a job "somewhere in Hyrum" (T. 56). The mere knowledge that a crime is
about to be committed does not constitute such person
an accomplice, no matter how reprehensible such conduct may be. State v. Mercer, 114 Mont. 142, 133 P.2d
358 (1943).

4

.Th: fact that the parties were using Hunfs automobile is not sufficient in and of itself to make him
an accomplice and the theory of Hunt being a lookout
clefies common sense. Hunt was seen waiting over one
block away by an eye witness (T. 43).
Both Hunt and 1\-Iary Jones testified that they
drove around the town of Hyrum awaiting the retur;1
of appellant and Nielson. They returned to the meeting
area too early then drove around for seYeral more minutes ( T. 131). A mobile lookout is a rather novel innov3-tion when the lookout is driving several blocks from
the scene of the crime and stopping to rest indiscriminately.
The further fact that he did not report the crime
to the police during or immediately after its commission
does not make him an accomplice, but only possibly
an accessory under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-45 (1953),
providing: "All persons who, after full knowledge that
a felony has been committed, conceal it from a magistrate, or harbor and protect the person who committed
it, are accessories." This court had held that accessories
are not accomplices within the meaning of U tab Code
Ann.§ 77- 31-18 (1953), or its predecessors, requiring
corroboration of accomplices' testimony. People v.
Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737 (1891); State v.
Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458, (1937).
There was much made of the fact that Hunt was
apparently working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an informer. He was supposed to attempt to

5

obtain information about car theft activities of appellant and Nielson ( T. 100) . The fact that he actuallv
informed on appellant for a burglary involving narcoti;s
would not seem to deprive him of his status of an informant, as it has been held one who under the direction
of an officer or on his own initiative feigns complicity
in a crime in order to detect the perpetrator is not an
accomplice, People v. Piaschik, 159 Cal. App.2d 622,
323 P.2d 1032 (1958).
In Hyde v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 452, 165 S.W. 195
( 1915), a witness, who when a burglary was suggested
seemingly consented, stood along side the building
while it was being burglarized, and accepted part of
lhe money stolen, which he later turned over to the
police and identified the men who committed the burglary, was held not to be an accomplice:
There are certain relations recognized by law
in which voluntary cooperation of a person with
the accused does not render such person an accomplice. Thus, those who cooperate with a view
to aid justice by detecting a crime . . . even
though ... he unites and apparently approves
... [is not an accomplice.] (Holmes v. State, 70
Tex. Crim. 214, 156 S.W. 1171 (1913).)
This court had held "an accomplice is a person
who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent
with the principal offender, unites in the commission
of a crime. The cooperation in the crime must be real,
not merely apparent." State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, at
98, 227 Pac. 203 (1929).
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. The respondent would submit that under no possible theory could Hunt be considered an accomplice;
therefore, his testimony stands.

POINT II
STATE'S WITNESS .MARY JONES vVAS
NOT AN ACCOMPLICE AS A MATTER OF
LAW; THEREFORE, HER TESTIMONY REQUIRES NO CORROBORATION.
Appellant contends that Mary Jones, the other
State witness, was also an accomplice. Respondent
would submit that there was not one scintilla of evidence adduced at trial showing a prior knowledge by
Mary Jones that this drug store was to be burglarized.
It was clear from the record that Mary Jones was
not privy to any conversation that might have taken
place concerning the burglary. She testified that when
she saw appellant bring a crowbar from his home, she
"figured something was up," but did not know what
it was ( T. 151 ) . It was not until the car had circled
the drug store three or four times that she had an indication that a burglary attempt was imminent (T. 154).
Mary Jones admitted that she consumed some of the
stolen narcotics and could therefore be liable under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-12 (1953) for receiving stolen
property, but this would not render her an accomplice
as to the burglary whose testimony need be corroborated.
In State v. Bowman, supra, where witness stored stolen
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goods in his house, this court held that his testimon.
in the trial of defendants for the burglary need
be corroborated as he was an accessory or a receiver
of stolen property; that being a distinct crime from the
one which the defendant was convicted. "An accomplice
is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical
offense charged against the defendant on trial." State
v. Fertig, 120 Utah 224 at 227, 233 P.2d 347 (1951).
One who could not be convicted of the crime with which
the defendant is charged is not an accomplice no matter
how culpable his conduct in connection therewith may
be. State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071 ( 1934).

n;t

1\1ary Jones lacked the essential element of being an
accomplice, that of a common criminal intent shared
with the principal offender.
Mere knowledge that a crime is about to be committed does not make on an accomplice. State v. JJlercer,
133 P.2d 358 at 351, 114 ~Iont. 142 (1943):
A person cannot be characterized ~s a pri1:1cipal simply because he is present while a ~ru~e
is perpetrated pr~vided he takes no part .m it.
He must render aid to the actor and share m the
criminal intent of him who actually committed
the offense . . .

People v. Wooten, 162 Cal. App.2d 804, 328 P.2d
1040 ( 1958), to the same effect State v. Johnson, 57
N.~I. 716, 263 P.2d 282 (19.53), State v. Moczygemba,
234 Ore. 141, 379 P.2d 557 (1963).
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In a case strikingly similar factually to the present
case, in which the two defendants got out of the car
in which they, the victim, and the State's witnesses
were riding to repair the car and while so engaged,
out of earshot of the witness and victim, dicussed
robbing the victim, and subsequently did so, giving the
victims' s wallet to the witnes for safekeeping, the Arizona Court held that in the absence of preconsent, mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not make one
an accomplice and the fact that the witness received
stolen property did not make her an accomplice to the
homicide whose testimony need be corroborated. State
v. Sims, 99 Ariz. 302, 409 P.2d 17 (1965).
Respondent submits that Mary Jones was not an
accomplice, and the fact that she may have been an
accessory, a receiver of stolen property, or chargeable
with some other offense does not make her an accomplice; therefore, her testimony need not be corroborated.
This attitude was shared by the trial court when
it held that l\ilary Jones was not in any way a participant
(T. 165), notwithstanding the fact that she shared in
its fruits.
POINT III
NEITHER OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES
WERE INF ACT OR IN LA '~r ACCOMPLICES,
AND IN ANY EVENT, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED TO CORROBORATE THEIR TESTIMONY.
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Respondent has shown that neither Dennis Hunt
nor Mary Jones were accomplices in the crime for
which appellant stands convicted.
Corroborative evidence, to be sufficient need not
go to all material facts but may be slight and entitled
to a little consideration. State v. W oodhall, 6 Utah 2d
8, 305 P.2d 483 (1956); State v. Virgil_. 123 Utah 495,
260 P.2d 539 ( 1953). It must be consistent with guilt
and inconsisent with innocence and connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Circumstantial
evidence may constitute corroboration. State v. Park,
44 Utah 360, 140 Pac. 768 (1914).
The druggist and the sheriff testified that there
were two sets of footprints leading from the back of
the store across the field and one set had pointed toe
and small heel marks ( T. 136) . Miss Jones and Mr.
Hunt testified that the appellant and Mr. Nielson
alighted from the car on the road and went across the
field towards the drug store ( T. 132) . Mis Jones testified that Mr. Nielson had on boots with narrow toes
and small heels on the night of the burglary and that
he said he would have to "get rid" of them (T. 136).
The druggist testified that a door to the drug store
had been pried off. Miss Jones testified that she heard
a "screeching" sound coming from the vicinity of the
drug store. These circumstances, taken together, respondent submits, constitute independent physical evidence which corroborates the witness' tetimony.
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CONCLUSION
The facts in the instant case amply demonstrate
that the trial court acted properly in finding appellant
guilty of the crime charged. The legal claims of error
on which appellant relies for reversal are wholly without merit. The two State witnesses were not accomplices
and their testimony does not, therefore, reqmre corroboration. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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